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Performance Findings of the International Assembly Plant Study
John Paul MacDuffie & Frits K. Pil1
Under the sponsorship of MIT’s International Motor Vehicle Program and the Sloan
Foundation, we r cently undertook the largest in-depth evaluation ever of automobile assembly
plants around the world.  In the Second Round of the International Assembly Plant Study, we
surveyed 88 automobile assembly plants representing 20 companies and as many nations   (see
figure 1 for a distribution of plants by region of the world).  We collected data on a host of
different issues ranging from production processes and design choices to labor relations and
organization of work.  Here we report on our performance findings.  In addition to reporting on
our most recent findings, reflecting performance in 1993/4, we will compare those with the
performance findings of the First Round of the International Assembly Plant Study which took
place in 19892.
European plants have shown the great st percentage improvement in productivity of any
region, but Korean plants, and plants in North America have also shown considerable gain.  Given
the minimal improvement in the average performance of Japanese-owned assembly plants in J pan,
the performance gap between US and Japanese plants has closed significantly, although a
differential still remains.
In the area of quality, the European and US producers have shown tremendous
improvement, and are approaching Japanese quality levels.  However, our quality data nly
reflects vehicles sold in the United States, and as such, may overstate the average quality level of
the European producers.  The quality level of new entra t plants (particularly Korea) has not
followed the world-wide trend in improvement in quality.
One of our most important observations from this round is that there are tremendous
performance differentials within each region of the world.  This reflects different capabilities of
companies operating in those regions.  We are currently undertaking extensive analyses to
understand the drivers of these intra-regional performance differences.
1 We wish to acknowledge the generous help of automobile producers world-wide who have helped us in our
research, and J.D. Power and Associates for letting us use their quality data.
2Because of missing data, some figures will be based on a smaller sample -- in such instances sample size is
provided.
Productivity Comparisons
Figures 2 and 3 describe the productivity trends from 1989-1993.  These figures present
two different cuts on the Round 1 a Round 2 data.  The full Round 1 sample comprises 62
plants from 24 companies and 20 countries, while the full Round 2 sample comprises 75 plants
from 20 companies and 20 countries.  Forty-four plants are common between the two sampl s.  In
Figure 2, we present the full sample for 1989 compared with the full sample for 1993.  This is the
most representative picture of what was ppening in the world industry at these two points in
time.  However, the samples are not identical in the two years.  Therefore, we also present, in
Figure 3, the results for the matched sample of 44 plants.  As will become clear, the patterns in
these two figures are very similar.
Before presenting the productivity results, it is worth noting the distinctive methodology of
the International Assembly Plant Study, developed by John Krafcik during Round 1 of the
research, and further refined by MacDuffie and Pil.  This methodology makes many adjustments to
insure maximum comparability across plants.  For example, we focus on a set of "standard
activities" that are common to virtually all plants in the sample.  We thus correct for differences in
vertical integration that most studies miss.  These other studies penalize plants that are more
vertically integrated (which includes many plants in Europe and North America), and thus do not
provide an unbiased comparison for all producers.  We also make a set of adjustments for product
differences that these other studies do not make.  We are confident, based on our extensive
interaction with automakers in the US, Europe, Japan, and other parts of the world, that the IMVP
productivity methodology provides the most rigorous and thorough measurement available
anywhere.
Figure 2 provides the full sample comparisons for productivity.  It shows that European
plants made almost a 30% improvement in productivity, dropping their hours per vehicle from
36.9 to 25.3.  For 1993, we also make a distinction between plants in Euro e owned by European
companies, and plants in Europe owned by US or Japanese com ies3.  The European owned
plants in Europe are somewhat poorer performers having an average productivity of 27.1 hours per
vehicle -- about 10% worse than their US or Japanese owned plants in Europe.  New Entrant
plants, in countries like Korea, Brazil, and Mexico, showed almost as great an improvement as the
European plants, and at 29.7 hours per vehicl , are only four or five hours behind the average
European plant, and only an hour or two behind the productivity levels of he av rage European
plants owned by European companies.  The U.S.-owned (i.e.  Big Three) plants in North America
(U.S.  and Canada) improved their productivity from 24.9 to 21.7 hours per vehicle -- an
3 2 For confidentiality reasons, all our groupings are comprised of at least four plants from at least three
different companies. For this reason, we are unable at this time to break out the Japanese from the US producers in
Europe.
improvement of 12.8%.  In comparison, Japanese-owned plants in Japan showed a minimal
change in productivity over this period, from 16.8 to 16.2 hours per vehicle -- an improvement of
only 3.6%.  However, Japanese-owned plants in North America -- the so-called "transplants" --
improved their productivity by 18.7%, and are quickly approaching the erformance levels of their
counterparts in Japan.
Figure 3 shows similar regional averages for the matched sample of plants that participated
in both Round 1 and Round 2.   The most notable differences from Figure 2 are a higher
percentage improvement in productivity (i.e.  reduction in hours per vehicle) for the Big Three
plants (17%) and for Japanese plants in Japan (5.8%) and a much small percentage improvement
for New Entrant plants (13.9%).  These differences reveal characteristics of the plants included in
Figure 2 but not in Figure 3 -- in particular, the plants in the Round 2 average that did not
participate in Round 1.  The Big Three plants appearing for the first time in Round 2 had a
somewhat lower productivity level than those in the matched sample; the same is true for Japanese
plants in Japan.  In contrast, the plants in the New Entrant category appearing for the first time in
Round 2 had a significantly higher productivity level than those in the matched sample; these ar
primarily newly-opened greenfield plants in Korea.
We would argue that, while the averages in Figure 2 may provide the most representative
picture of productivity in each year, the results shown for the matched sample in Figure 3 provide
the more accurate picture of the rate of improvement over the five year period of 1989-1994.
Based on these figures, we find that the rate of improvement for the European plants is nearly
double that of the Big Three plants.  However, this is due in part to the extreme performance gap
between the European plants and both the U.S.  and Japan in 1989.  While the Big Three began a
push to increase productivity in response to c mpetitive pressure in the early 1980s,  many of the
European companies did not embark on a similarly urgent effort until the late 1980s or early 1990s.
It is important to note that the regional averages contained in both figures conceal
considerable variation in productivity across plants within each region.  Figure 4 reveals the extent
of this variation, showing the average, minimum, and aximum hours per vehicle for plants in
each region.  The range is quite large in some regions -- the best European plant is three times as
productive as the worst plant, and the best US and Japanese plants are twice as productive as the
worst plants from their region.  It is important to note that there is as great a range in productivity
for US/Japanese owned plants in Europe as there is for European owned plants in Europe.  The
ranges portrayed r veal major differences across companies within the different regions.  Indeed,
differences in company-level capabilities are likely to be far more significant for productivity than
country differences.  Thus the fact that the widest range of productivity performance is in Europe
may reflect the range of company capabilities found there, more than country differences (although
in some cases, company and country are strongly conf unded).  The smallest range for
productivity is found among the Japanese transplants, which may reflect that they are all new
greenfield plants adjusting to the U.S.  context.
Quality Comparisons
Quality trends are similar in many ways to those for productivity.  Much of the quality gap
between European and American companies and their Japanese competitors has been closed.
However, the variation among plants in each regional grouping is even larger than for productivity.
Once again, we believe this reflects the fact that companies still differ widely in their ability to
achieve outstanding quality.
We derive the quality data presented here by examining the Initial Quality Survey data
gathered annually by J.D. Power and adjusting it to reflect only defects that are directly related to
assembly plants.  The Initial Quality Survey (IQS) is based on a random sample of new car
purchasers in the U.S. who are asked to fill out a detailed questionnaire about their experience with
their new vehicle after approximately four months of use.  These data are only available for
vehicles sold in the United States.  We are very grateful to J.D.  Power for providing these data.
In our adjustment, we focus on such defects as gaps and irregularities in the “fit” of body
panels, scratches or runs or other problems with the painted surface, water leaks, and electrical
defects.  We exclude certain categories, such as engine or transmission defects, that we believe
should be attributed to the plants where these components are made.
Figure 5 shows the average defects p r 100 vehicles for the same regional groupings used
in the productivity analysis.  Here we sho  two time periods of data, for 1989, and 1993/4.  We
present IQS data for all plants in each category whose vehicles are sold in the U.S.  market.  For
some regions, we have more plants with quality numbers from J.D.  Power than plants with
productivity numbers from the IMVP Assembly Plant Survey, while this is reversed for other
regions that sell relatively few vehicles in the U.S.
The dominant trend in Figure 5 is clearly convergence towards quality levels in the rang  of
60 defects per 100 vehicles, with the exception of the New Entrant group of plants whose quality
actually worsened over this period.  The greatest improvement is shown by European plants,
which went from an average of 91 defects per vehicle in 1989, to 61 defects per vehicle in 1993/4.
It must be remembered, however, that this only includes plants selling vehicles in the US -- plants
that produce primarily high-end, luxury type vehicles.  The Big Three plants in North America,
made almost as great an improvement bringing their defects down to 63 defects per vehicle.  While
this closed much of the quality gap with J anese competitors, there was improvement during this
period for both plants i  Japan (15% fewer defects) and the North American Japanese transplants
(18% fewer defects), so a small difference in regional averages still remains.
It is worth noting that over this period, the Japanese transplants in North America have
eliminated any gap in quality performance with their sister plants in Japan.  The other notable trend
is the worsening of quality for the New Entrant plants by 10% between 1989 and 1993/4.  This is
primarily attributable to a period of labor conflict in the Korean industry following the political
changes in that country and an explosion in domestic demand which has placed a premium on high
volume production.  The Korean automakers are already showing signs of returning to more
competitive levels of quality, although they still lag behind the other regional groupings.
Figure 6 shows the range of quality within each region.  He  the range of performance
within regions is even greater than for productivity.  The widest range exists for the Japanese
companies in Japan, with a five-fold difference in the number of defects per 100 vehicles between
the best and worst plant.  While the best Japanese companies have grown stronger and stronger in
terms of quality performance, the pressures of the extended recession for the Japanese industry are
reflected in quality problems for the weaker companies.  The range in quality performance is also
quite wide for European plants and for the Big Three plants in North America, with two to three-
fold differentials in defects between the best and worst plant.  While some of this variation is
specific to certain types of products (e.g.  the sports cars that are most purchased by en husiasts
tend to have the highest reported defects per 100 vehicles), overall it reflects persistent difference in
company capabilities for achieving quality. The narrowest range in performance for quality is for
the Japanese transplants in North America.  This reveals how important it has been for these plants
to show that their quality is equal or better than that of plants in Japan.
The convergence in quality performance reflected in th  regio al levels may also conceal
differences in company strategies for achieving quality.  We are aware of some plants and
companies that have boosted quality primarily through additional expenditures on post-process
inspection and repair, while others have been more successful at “building it right the first time.”
We expect that the former set of plants that improve quality through inspection will not only incur
higher costs but will also have weaker capabilities with respect to long term continuous
improvement in quality than the latter set of plants.
Variety
A final comparison to consider among these regional groupings concerns product variety.
While product variety (or product complexity) is often considered primarily as a factor that can
affect productivity and quality, it is also an increasingly important outcome in its own right.
Particularly in the U.S. market, the number of different vehicles available to consumers has
increased dramatically over the years.  Consumer seem to like having so many choices among
vehicles that fill an increasing number of finely differentiated market niches.
While companies must be careful not to produce product variants that consumers don’t
want to buy (as well as avoiding having too many products in the same market niche), companies
that are able to produce high product variety in their assembly plants have a number of advantages
over more traditional plants that are dedicated to a single product.  First, such plants are an
important resource for a company with a product development strategy of high variety.  Second,
these plants are typically much more flexible, with respect to technology, worker skills, and the
organizational capabilities for rapid ch ngeover from one product to another.  This flexibility
enables plants to respond more effectively to a wide variety of changes in their comp titive
environment.  A plant that can produce two different models in a varying product mix is much
better able to cope with fluctuating demand for these models than a dedicated plant.
The assembly plants with the highest levels of product variety have typically been those that
produce the most different models for export -- Japanese plants in Japan and European plants. Big
Three plants in North America have typically been much more dedicated to single models.  Also,
the Japanese transplants started their operations in North America with very low product variety
while they established their production system philosophy and have slowly increased that variety
over time.
Figure 7 shows the regional averages in Round 2 for product variety at the most
fundamental level -- what we call Model Mix Complexity.  This measure is based on the number of
different platforms (e.g.  the core design, comprising a common chassis and wheelbase), different
models (e.g.  Ford Taurus and Mercury Sable would be two models built on a common platform)
and different body st les (e.g.  2-door, 4-door, 5-door) built in a given plant.  Model mix
complexity is quite high for Japanese plants in Japan, with the next highest complexity level am ng
plants in Europe and the Japanese transplants.  Big Three plants in North America and New
Entrant plants have the lowest levels of this fundamental product variety.
While some observers believe that the Japanese automakers have gone too f r with product
variety (and these companies hav  trimmed some models and product variants in recent years),
maintaining the capability for high product variety in most assembly plants continues to be a high
strategic priority for these companies.  To the extent that Big Three plants have achieved their
impressive productivity and quality gains by sticking with their traditional policy of dedicated
plants (or, as in some cases, reducing variety still further for greater focus), they may find
themselves at a competitive disadvantage in world markets that respond very favorably to having
lots of product choices.
A company’s approach to product variety also tends to affect their policy towa ds
technology investment.  High variety companies are more likely to invest in flexible or
programmable automation than low-variety companies that are tempted by the lower cost of
dedicated equipment.  As the price difference between these types of echnology closes, these
investment patterns may change.  But, as noted bove, the flexibility that plants develop to handle
high levels of product variety can also benefit them in many other ways.  The Big Three compan es
should be alert to the benefits of reversing their traditional orientation in this area and consider
moving more quickly towards highly flexible assembly plants -- in terms of worker skills and
organizational capabilities for change as well as programmable automation.
Discussion
The European plants have shown tremendous improvement over the last few years.
However, many still have a long way to go to achieve world-wide productivity standards.  The fact
that some European plants are among the best in the world, suggests there is high potential for
closing the gap further.  While many European plants are still playing catch-up, plants in other
parts of the world are finding ways to not only further improve their performance, but also to
increase production flexibility, build to order, and so forth.
Our data regarding the Big Three confirm the popular perception that they have shown
tremendous improvement over the last five years in terms of productivity and quality.  However,
we believe that many of these gains are the result of st amlining fairly traditional production
practices.  It is not clear how much additional improvement can be garnered without substantive
changes in factors like work practices and flexible automation.  The Big Three have also opted to
take a low-variety approach in many of their plants.  We expect that over time they will face the
challenge of how to successfully incorporate additional variety in those plants.
Several companies in Newly Industrialized Countries are becoming incr asingly good
performers.  Their productivity levels are now on par ith many European and US plants, and
they are capable of handling fairly extensive variety.  When their quality reaches acceptable levels,
they will pose a serious threat outside of their home countries, and in particul r to the European
market.
Japanese companies continue to lead the pack in all aspects of  performance.   However,
there is tremendous variation within Japan, and many European and US plants are as good or even
better than mediocre Japanese plants.  Many Japanese companies are continuing their quest for
productivity and quality gains, and while performance differe s with producers in other parts of
the world are narrowing, a gap remains.
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